The Great Swedish Experiment by Gong, Xiaofan & Ratzkin, Michael
 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 3 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
53 
The Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics, and World Affairs 
Volume. I, Issue. III, 53-90, June 2021 
 
The Great Swedish Experiment 
 
 




ABSTRACT: As COVID-19 spread across Europe, many countries chose to implement swift and 
stringent lockdown measures on their populations in March 2020 by shutting down businesses 
and banning large public and private gatherings. Sweden, however, chose to manage the 
pandemic by relying on its citizens to make the best decisions for themselves and their families. 
This paper places Sweden’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic in a political and economic 
context. The paper also analyzes the country’s response and effectiveness in implementing 
voluntary and stepwise actions. Research finds that although measures taken to slow transmission 
while accounting for efforts to preserve the economy did not come close to achieving their 
medical goal, whether refraining from a shutdown was enough to save the economy in a 
significant way is less clear.  
“Of all the words of mice and men, the saddest are, ‘It might have been.’” 




On November 16th, 2020, after months of refusing to legally lockdown the country, 
Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven announced that strict bans on public gatherings of more 
than 8 people would be implemented in response to the dramatic rise in coronavirus cases in the 
fall. Noting that these measures are the most invasive in modern Sweden, Löfven hoped to send a 
clear message to the public on the need for social distancing. “It is a clear and sharp signal to 
every person in our country as to what applies in the future. Don’t go to the gym, don’t go to the 
library, don’t have dinner out, don’t have parties — cancel!” Mr. Löfven told a press 
conference.1 
This new message served as a stark contrast to the attitude that the Swedish government 
and Public Health Agency (PHA) held earlier in the year, when cases were low and Sweden had 
seemingly successfully flattened the curve despite having avoided a shutdown of the country. On 
May 8th, Sweden’s state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell boasted in a webinar held by the 
International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), “The Swedish model is showing you can get very far 
by voluntary measures''.2 The backdrop to this change in tone is the surge of positive coronavirus 
cases Sweden experienced starting mid-October (Exhibit 6).  
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While many countries in Europe chose to implement swift and stringent lockdown 
measures in March 2020 by shutting down businesses and banning large public and private 
gatherings, Sweden chose to manage the pandemic by relying on its citizens to make the best 
decisions for themselves and their families (Exhibit 7). Sweden kept most businesses, schools, 
and workplaces open, and throughout the spring and summer, life in Sweden continued more-or-
less the same way as before. Eight months later, on November 5th, 2020, Sweden reported an 
alarming figure of 4,744 new coronavirus cases, the highest number the country had seen since the 
beginning of the pandemic, and it seems to be trending up.3  
As approval ratings along with confidence in the government dropped, domestic scrutiny 
centered on the Swedish government’s response. Löfven and Tegnell were both forced to publicly 
deny reports in Swedish media of a rift between the government and the PHA.4 Internationally, 
countries around the world stay attuned to Sweden’s pandemic response, waiting to see whether 
its unique approach in balancing public health and the economy worked better strict lockdown 
measures. 
 
Hej! Välkommen till Sverige! 
Covering 528,447 km, Sweden is the fifth largest country in Europe and roughly the same 
size as California in the United States and with a relatively low population density. With a 
population of 10.23 million,5 it is the largest among the countries in Scandinavia and ranks 15th 
in Europe in terms of population. 
The nation of Sweden is one of Europe’s oldest, beginning with its relationship with and 
contribution to the Vikings. The country has on occasion displayed an adversity to the European 
mainstream and is not a stranger to straying from the herd in a global context. Europe, on the 
contrary, is a continent unified both geographically and politically, has a strong big-government 
background. It favors left-wing social and economic policies. When a problem is at hand, the 
continent understands government to be the solution.  
Sweden had instances of breaking from European traditions early and hard. This trend was 
born as were many European trends: in the context of the evolution of Christianity. Martin Luther, 
the father of Protestantism, was a German, but his influence quickly spread around Northern 
Europe. Quickly, a continent defined by Catholicism began to show cracks in its theological 
foundations. At the forefront was Sweden.  “It seems difficult to overstate,” explains Professor 
Inge Jonnson of the University of Stockholm. “Luther’s influence in Swedish social history.” The 
Protestant faith preached and spread by Martin Luther was, at its core, a contradiction to the 
European consensus. This modus operandi only continued. The people of Sweden had no interest 
in joining the European Union for decades after its inception. A famously — or notoriously — 
neutral country, Sweden feared the inherently political organization would diminish its 
independence. Johnson relays, “Swedish membership had been rejected as incompatible with 
neutrality since the 1960s.” It was only during the financial crisis in the 1990s that the country 
finally decided to alter its lonely course. “It is just logical that Sweden is often called ‘the reluctant 
ally’ in EU circles.”6  
 
Swedish Political and Government System  
Sweden’s parliamentary representative constitutional monarchy is led by a prime minister 
and functions at three levels: national, regional, and local. On the national level, the federal 
government is composed of the office of the prime minister as well as a multitude of semi-
autonomous agencies. Sweden’s highest regional level of government is the county council, which 
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is made up of twenty counties. The county council deals with issues such as health care and 
tributary affairs. Stockholm is by far Sweden’s most populous county with 2,377,081 inhabitants 
followed by Västa, Götaland, and Skåne.7 On the local level, Sweden is divided into 290 
municipalities. Each municipality designates its own elected body, tasked with governing over a 
plethora of issues. These elected bodies are responsible for providing many services, including 
housing, schooling, elderly care and childcare.8  
The Riksdag operates as Sweden’s parliamentary legislative body and is composed of 349 
members who are directly elected by citizens. Representatives in the Riksdag come from a handful 
of parties. The left-winged, Social Democratic Party, that of current Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, 
has dominated Swedish politics for over a century.  The next largest party is the Moderate Party 
followed by the Swedish Democrats and the Centre Party.9 Government in Sweden is meant to 
only exercise nominal administrative duties and not to step on the people’s toes. Mass movement 
is protected by the constitution, and the national government is generally restricted from imposing 
sweeping mandates. Policy and administration in Sweden operate under a dualistic relationship, 
whereby those elected to lead place a great deal of responsibility on local government as well as 
civic duty and personal responsibility on the citizens. 
In 2018, Löfven lost a confidence vote to hold a majority in the Riksdag with the Social 
Democrats.  Despite being excluded from the center-right “Alliance” that was formed by the 
opposition parties such as the Moderate Party, the Center Party, the Liberals and the Christian 
Democrats, the Swedish Democrats, a populist, right wing, nationalist party increased its vote 
totals from 12.7% to 17.5%, becoming the third largest party in the Riksdag.  The Christian 
Democrats’ support waned from 31% to 28.4%, the lowest since 1908.10 The “Alliance” was 
dissolved. 
 
Healthcare Governance  
 
Like much else in Sweden, healthcare’s roots come from the legacy of the welfare state 
and is highly decentralized (Exhibit 1). The Health and Medical Service Act requires that regional 
councils provide every resident with good quality health care while the central government is 
responsible for establishing guidelines and principles to inform a national medical agenda. In 
Sweden, the local municipalities are tasked with providing elderly care as well as care for those 
with physical disabilities or psychological disorders.11 The PHA is one of the broadest reaching 
agencies when it comes to medicine in Sweden.     
 
Longstanding Societal and Cultural Values  
Swedish citizens have a rich history of active participation in the framing of the country’s 
values and policy. Civilian action has been responsible for achieving many landmark reforms in 
Sweden’s history.  One of the most prominent ways through which reforms are accomplished is 
through the active involvement of civilians in social movements. Civilian-led social movements 
have been responsible for gains in childcare and equal working conditions through the women’s 
movement, gaining education and public health care. Additionally, ordinary citizens fought for 
environmental protections, labor rights and social due to an ingrained cultural sense of investment 
in the community and trust in achieving change through politics.12 Sweden’s active citizenry 
operates as an amplifier for its democracy.  
Part of the reason citizen involvement in political issues is so strong is because the central 
tenets of Swedish culture and society that emphasize personal responsibility and trust in one 
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another, which allows for individual flexibility. Because Swedes have a deep sense of what they 
ought to do as individuals for their own betterment in tandem with altruistic societal motivations, 
they trust each other to make the right decisions. Sweden consistently ranks the most extreme 
nation in the world in terms of self-expressionist and secular beliefs on the world value survey 
(Exhibit 14). Cultures that hold the individual as more of an independent actor, like Sweden does, 
are more likely to allow for individual flexibility and risk-taking. “National culture in... Sweden 
views the individual as an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity who comprises a unique 
configuration of internal attributes; thus, [Sweden] encourages individual flexibility and risk-
taking, consistent with these loose cultural values.”13 
For most of the last century, Sweden has consistently taken in refugees, operating as a 
beacon of asylum for those hoping to escape persecution. Jews, Danes and Estonians were allowed 
in during the Second World War. Chilean nationals fleeing the bloody tyranny of Augusto Pinochet 
as well as those fleeing war and genocide in former Yugoslavia found a home with open arms. 
Swedes were happy to distinguish themselves from the trend of tightening borders in Europe 
during the 1990’s and the 2000’s with relatively bipartisan enthusiasm. This tendency to open up 
and extend a helping hand became thought of as a form of Swedish Exceptionalism, following a 
pattern of nationalist sentiments of moral superiority being tied to a policy adopted in Sweden.  
 
Yet during the refugee crisis in 2015, fearing “system collapse” following a pouring in of 
migrants which resulted in a strained welfare system as well as increasing crime, with over 160,000 
asylum applications.  Löfven had lamented then, “It pains me that Sweden is no longer capable of 
receiving asylum seekers at the high level we do today. We simply cannot do any more,” reversing 
his position in just over half a year. This marked what some came to view as the death of Swedish 
Exceptionalism. The far-right nationalist Social Democrats captured the opportunity to posit 
themselves as the one party that had consistently called for restrictions to immigration and gained 
momentum, as the Swedish population became more unified on restricting immigration.14 
Once known for the “Middle Way” between liberalized and controlled markets, Sweden 
has recently engaged in somewhat extreme policy measures, opting to operate from the fringes. 
Sweden went from having one of the most developed welfare states on earth to liberalizing it 
and having one of the most market friendly basic education systems in the world after the 1990’s. 
The trend from one extreme to the next is apparent in the shift in attitude toward migrants from 
welcoming to very strict. 
The word lagom, in Swedish, means “moderately,” and bears great cultural 
significance.  Ikea’s slogan is “Live Lagom,” and the principle of not living too extravagantly is 
one that many Swedes take to heart.  Lagom, tied in with the self-conception of the “Middle Way”, 
may seem at odds with what seems to be somewhat of a radical streak among the 
Swedish.  However, the seemingly docile temperament of Swedes as it feeds into a consensus 
culture actually allows for the political pendulum to shift more dramatically when it does shift as 
Swedes unite on issues.  As sociologist Daniel Lindvall puts it, “Our sense of ourselves as lagom 
makes it much easier to make dramatic change here, as opposed to societies that are more 
contentious. In other words, our extremism is made possible by our culture of consensus. Since we 
find ways to agree, it’s easier to move policies or whole sectors quickly, even abruptly.”15 Lindvall 
refers to it as the “paradox of consensus culture” where individual modesty results in a collective 
extremism. 
As of 2016, single-person households were the most prominent of European households, 
making up 33% of all households.16 Sweden led the other European countries with the greatest 
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proportion, 52%, a decisive majority of households in Sweden being occupied by a single person, 
totaling 1.8 million.  In Sweden, a significant proportion of the working population has the ability 
to work from home.17 As of 2019, 62% of enterprises included people who would work at home 
and roughly a fifth of all Swedes regularly tele-worked.  
 
The Swedish Economy  
Although Sweden is a relatively small country in terms of its population, it is one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world.  Exports account for about one-third of Sweden’s GDP. Most 
Swedish enterprises and businesses are privately owned and market-oriented, although there is a 
large public sector as well. Government spending is also a large fraction of the country’s GDP, 
amounting to 49.7% over the past three years. Budget surpluses have an average of 1.1% of GDP, 
and public debt is equal to 39% of GDP. 18  
 
Trade 
  The Swedish economy is open and heavily dependent on free international trade with about 
one-third of its GDP being made up of exports. Svante Öberg, Deputy Governor of the Swedish 
Central Bank, the Riksbank, remarked in January 2009 in the midst of the financial crisis: “Sweden 
is a small and open economy with extensive foreign trade and a financial market that is well 
integrated with the international markets. Sweden's dependence on the outside world has increased 
over time.”19 Sweden trades heavily with its Scandinavian and European neighbors, with Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Norway, Finland, and Denmark account for about two-fifths of Sweden’s 
export market.20  
Swedish manufacturing is export-oriented and produces the bulk of the country’s export 
income. Over the years, the emphasis has shifted from export of raw materials and semi-
manufactured products such as pulp, steel, sawn wood to finished goods, the majority of which is 
dominated by engineering products such as cars, telecommunications equipment, hydroelectric 
power plant equipment, and, increasingly, high technology and chemical and biotechnology.21 
Imports are more diversified than exports, with the top imports being cars, crude and refined 
petroleum, and vehicle parts. Germany is the main supplier of Sweden’s imports. In 2018, good 
exported totaled to $162 billion USD, and goods imported totaled to $160 billion USD.22 
  
Service Sector and the Labor Market   
More than one-third of actively employed Swedes work in the service sector. In 2017, 
Sweden exported $66.3 billion worth of services, the top services being computer and information 
services, business, professional, and technical services, as well as travel services. Services 
imported totaled $60.2 billion, mainly comprising travel, business, professional, and technical 
services.23 Tourism also plays an important role in the Swedish economy, contributing to 2.6% of 
Sweden’s GDP in 2017.24 
Like its neighbor Denmark, Sweden is also highly unionized, with about four-fifths of all 
workers belonging to labor and trade unions. Unions take charge of negotiating agreements that 
cover issues such as fair wages, pensions, insurances, and annual leave days.25 Unemployment 
averaged 6.02% from 1980 until 2020, and was addressed by government investments in education 
and entrepreneurship.26 Notably, a short-time working scheme was introduced by the government 
in 2014 to increase flexibility in the labor market, where employers can reduce their employees’ 
working hours and receive financial support from the central government to compensate for a 
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significant part of the costs for retaining the employee. This measure can only be activated in a 
deep recession.27 In 2019, the labor force participation rate was 73% and the employment rate was 
68%, both of which were both high by international standards. The gender employment gap of 4% 
is also small. The unemployment rate, 6.8%, was close to the European average.28  
Taxation 
  Taxes make up the majority of state revenues, which are used to maintain a high level of 
social services that have virtually eliminated structural poverty in the country. Personal income 
tax – ranging from 30 to 60 percent – are some of the highest in the world, but taxes for business, 
in comparison, are quite moderate.29 The top personal income tax rate is 57 percent, in comparison 
to the top corporate tax rate of 21.4 percent. The overall tax burden is equal to 44 percent of total 
domestic income. Since the late 1990s, there has been a shift away from tax on personal income 
and towards taxing goods and services and social security contributions.30 Social insurance policies 
have been changed to encourage greater participation in the workforce, and pension reforms paid 
into the pension system and the amount disbursed with the overall health of the economy.31  
 
Economic Performance, 2008 - 2019  
As the oldest central bank in the world, Sweden’s Riksbank has an objective of maintaining 
price stability, defined as the maintenance of a low, stable rate of inflation. More precisely, the 
Riksbank's target is to hold inflation in terms of the Consumer Price Index with Fixed Prices 
(CPIF) around 2 percent a year.32 The Riksbank played a pivotal role in navigating the Sweden 
financial markets through the 2008 Financial Crisis as well as the 2010 European Debt Crisis. In 
2008, the Riksbank deployed a number of initiatives to strengthen the fragile financial market and 
stabilize the financial system. These initiatives included general liquidity support measures 
through increasing loans and loan access as well as extending emergency liquidity assistance to 
individual banks, liquidity support to individual institutions to prevent institutions large and small 
from failing, and loan facilities to neighboring countries through swap agreements with central 
banks of several Baltic countries and Iceland.33 As a result, Sweden’s GDP contracted by 5% in 
2009 but bounced back with growth averaging 5% in the following two years.34   
The European Debt Crisis that started in 2010 with Greece’s sovereign debt crisis played 
out in a similar manner in Sweden. The domestic economy weakened in 2012 and 2013 as a result 
of weak economic outlook and development abroad, and inflation levels were lower-than-expected 
in 2013 due to the international economic slowdown and lower import prices.35 This trend 
continued in 2014, leading to the Riksbank adopting an expansionary monetary policy to stabilize 
the home economy.36 As the economy both domestic and abroad began to recover in 2015 and 
2016, the Riksbank continued to carefully monitor the situation, and Sweden has since been 
recuperating slowly.37    
According to annual Swedish Economy Reports by Sweden’s National Institute of 
Economic Research (NIER), coming out of the European Debt Crisis, 2015 saw strong growth in 
the Swedish economy through expansionary government fiscal policies that helped decrease 
unemployment rates,38 a trend that continued into 2016 and 2017, which saw an improvement in 
both business and consumer confidence as well as output and employment.39 However, underlying 
problems for the Swedish economy in the form of continuously weak economic conditions in 
Europe persisted throughout Sweden’s economic recovery, and the growth the economy had 
experienced peaked in the first half of 2018, after which had set into a slowdown phase.40  
By the end of the fiscal year in 2019, the Swedish economy was well settled into its 
slowdown phase, which was worsened by the uncertainty surrounding Brexit and US-China trade 
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disputes. Swedish export of goods saw slow overall growth, and household savings increased.41 
Unemployment was forecasted to slightly rise, and inflation was expected to drop well below 2 
per cent over the next few years. Household and business sector confidence, as well as export 
manufacturing orders, showed decline (Exhibit 4). The NIER noted in its December 2019 report, 
“Our forecast is based on the assumption that there is an orderly Brexit and that the global trade 
conflict does not escalate further. Should these assumptions prove false, there is a considerable 
risk of Swedish output falling well below potential. However, public finances are strong, and there 
is scope to soften any downturn with expansionary fiscal policy.”42  
 
COVID-19: The Pandemic the World Was Unprepared For  
In late December 2019, news from China alerted the world that a new respiratory virus was 
quickly spreading throughout the city of Wuhan in the province of Hubei. Much was unknown 
about the origins, symptoms, spread, and containment of the virus at the time. This was the origin 
of the novel coronavirus, also known as COVID-19. The first case of the coronavirus outside of 
China was confirmed on January 13th, 2020, and has since spread all over the world, presenting 
the world with one of the most challenging and dire public health crises in modern history.43 The 
World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared the coronavirus a pandemic on March 11th, 
2020, and countries around the globe quickly implemented nation-wide lockdown measures of 
varying levels of control and strictness shortly thereafter.44 The first case of COVID-19 in Sweden 
was confirmed by the PHA on January 31th, 2020 in a traveler from China. A few weeks thereafter, 
during the second week of March, community spread in Sweden was confirmed.45  
In response to the now-classified pandemic, Sweden adopted the same goals as most other 
countries, working to ‘flatten the curve’ by slowing the rate and volume of transmission so that 
the healthcare system could cope with the disease.46 However, unlike most other countries, much 
of Sweden’s implementation focused on voluntary and stepwise action, rather than legislation and 
compulsory measures.47 The government had relied on the voluntary social distancing and self-
restraint of its citizens, who received daily briefings and instructions concerning self-protection 
techniques from the PHA and press conferences held by state epidemiologists and government 
representatives (Exhibit 3). Recommendations the government published in March included 
avoiding social contact if one was experiencing symptoms of respiratory infection, working from 
home as much as possible, and isolating as much as possible for people over 70 years of age.48 
Higher secondary schools for children over 16 years of age were also encouraged to switch to 
distance learning to curb the spread of the disease.49  
Outside of these recommendations, the government put few hard restrictions in place. One 
restriction was the government’s decision to stop non-essential travel to Sweden from countries 
outside of the EEA and Switzerland. Additionally, visits to elderly care institutions were banned 
on April 1st.50 Public events with a headcount of more than 50 people were disallowed, and public 
spaces such as cafes, restaurants, and bars needed to minimize crowding and provide for physically 
distancing in each venue, which also applied to shops and public transportation.51 
Notably, however, Sweden’s top authorities refrained from recommending the usage of 
face masks,52 and have questioned the effectiveness of mask-wearing as opposed to physical 
distancing. The country also never closed daycare or schools for children under the age of 16.53 
The Swedish government has characterized their overall strategy as a ’common sense’, 
trust-based approach rather than strict measures, such as lockdowns, which they say are 
unsustainable over an extended period of time. Swedish authorities expressed that in their view, 
managing the COVID-19 pandemic would not be a sprint but a marathon—a long-term 
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undertaking.54 Thus, policies need to be designed on a level that is acceptable to the people over a 
long period of time. The government had time and time again emphasized the trust it places in its 
citizens to ‘make the right decision’, underlining the loose cultural values that Swedish citizens 
embody of individuals’ self-responsibility as well as the individual as an independent, self-
contained, and autonomous entity. On March 22th, Löfven gave an address to the nation where he 
emphasized the importance of self-restraint, declaring “Now we all have a great personal 
responsibility. There are a few critical times in life when you must make sacrifices, not just for 
your own sake, but also for those around you, for your fellow human beings, and for our country. 
That time is now. That day has come. And the duty is everyone’s.” (Exhibit 7) 
 
Federal Fiscal Response  
Despite the seemingly lax lockdown measures, the Swedish government devoted a 
substantial amount of capital and resources to help provide an adequate social safety net for 
businesses and people during this time. Total government support in 2020 amounted to 805 billion 
Swedish krona (SEK), equivalent to 16% of GDP and around 96 billion USD, which included SEK 
240 billion in budget measures, SEK 335 billion in liquidity measures, and SEK 230 billion in 
guarantees. In March, the government pushed out a number of measures aimed at cushioning the 
economic impact businesses were soon expected to brace for.55  
Some notable measures include allowing companies to defer three months’ worth of 
payment of employer social security contributions, preliminary tax on salaries, and value added 
tax (VAT) with interest. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were further allowed to defer 
VAT reported annually, including payments of last year's VAT that were due shortly. The 
government issued credit guarantees of up to SEK 5 billion for loans to airlines, SEK 3 billion for 
loans to SMEs, and guarantee 70% of new bank loans to companies experiencing financial 
difficulty due to COVID-19. Moreover, the government allowed for reduction of employers' social 
security contributions to the old age pension, providing relief of up to SEK 5,300 per employee 
per month. Temporary discount for rental costs in vulnerable sectors like consumer goods, hotels, 
and restaurants was additionally covered by the government for up to 50% of the fixed rent 
reduction. Later on, in April, the government announced a SEK 39 billion package to support 
businesses based on loss of turnover.56  
 
Monetary Response  
To help stabilize the economy, Swedish financial institutions also acted to provide relief 
measures. On March 13th, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) lowered its 
countercyclical capital buffer from 2.5% to 0% and postponed all new investigations and on sight 
supervisory activities in order to free up resources at the banks. The FSA further mandated the loss 
of income associated with COVID-19 as qualification for the bank and borrower to reach an 
agreement to reduce or suspend loan amortization payments for a limited period of time. It also 
clarified that it will temporarily allow banks to fall below the liquidity coverage ratio requirements 
to provide relief for liquidity constraints and stressed that it expected credit institutions to stop this 
year's dividend payments and instead, use the earnings to further strengthen their capital.57 
The Riksbank decided to lend up to SEK 500 billion to companies via the banks in order 
to avoid robust companies being knocked out and reduced the lending rate for overnight loans to 
banks from 0.75% to 0.20% above the repo rate while keeping the repo rate at 0%. Banks were 
allowed to borrow an unlimited amount at 3-month's maturity on a weekly basis against collateral 
at an interest rate of 20 basis points above the repo rate, and flexibility was increased on collateral 
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requirements for banks when they borrowed money from the Riksbank. The Riksbank also decided 
to increase purchases of securities by up to SEK 300 billion in 2020. On March 19th, the Riksbank 
and the US Federal Reserve agreed on a swap facility of 60 billion USD, which was extended on 
August 5th until March 31st, 2021.58  
 
Employment, Healthcare, and Social Initiatives 
To save Swedish jobs and ensure that employers and workers did not bear the full impact 
of COVID-19 on the economy, the government announced that employers’ wage costs can be 
halved, and the government would cover a larger share of the costs. This model is similar to short-
time work, but the subsidy level is significantly increased in that the employee receives more than 
90 per cent of their wage. Other measures included allowing workers unable to perform work due 
to sickness and quarantine to be entitled to state disease carrier allowance from the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency (SIA), which allowed workers to receive approximately 80% of their regular 
salary for up to 14 days. This also applied to self-employed workers. However, workers were 
required to submit a medical certificate proving they were infected or were suspected or at risk of 
carrying the disease in order to receive the allowance. A temporary parental allowance was also 
introduced to compensate parents for 90% of their salary in case they need to stay home and look 
after their children due to school closures.59  
 
Bracing for the First Wave  
As the pandemic grew in momentum, cases began rising rapidly in Sweden and on March 
17th, hospitals in the Stockholm area were directed not to admit patients whose age or body mass 
index exceeded 80 and 40, respectively. These patients were viewed as unlikely to be able to make 
a recovery and such was the situation that medical care had to be prioritized.60 
There was substantial domestic support behind the Swedish strategy, but there was also 
significant dissent. Swedes seemed to be divided on how to conceptualize the pandemic, but the 
largest proportion of people deferred to trusting their leaders with their fate. In April, roughly 31% 
of those surveyed believed that the country’s response to COVID-19 was simply not forceful 
enough while 18% were neutral and 51% considered the response to be appropriately forceful. 
Interestingly enough, despite the concerns that the country’s strategy was being executed at the 
expense of the safety of the elderly population, 40% of respondents aged 15-29 viewed the nation’s 
strategy as adequate compared to a higher figure 61% of those over 70. At this point, 49% of 
Swedes approved of Löfven’s handling of the pandemic as well.61 
 
Quarter One Economic Performance  
In the midst of the controversy surrounding its unconventional approach to handling the 
pandemic, the Swedish government released the first quarterly report of the fiscal year. 
Shockingly, Sweden was able to moderate the economic impact at the onset of the crisis, as the 
country’s GDP grew by 0.1% in the first quarter of 2020 from the fourth quarter of 2019. This 
contrasts with the sharp drop in GDP experienced by many other advanced economies indicated 
by the small increase in GDP for the first quarter of 2020 contrary to other advanced economies 
(Exhibit 15). Whereas Sweden experienced a 0.1% increase in GDP, in the Euro area, GDP had 
decreased by 3.7% and in the aggregate of the 27 countries of the EU, GDP decreased by 3.3%.62 
While the rather less restrictive measures helped cushion the immediate impact on the 
economy, exporting industries experienced declines in output as cross-borders value chains were 
disrupted. Durable consumer goods, travel services and capital goods-producing sectors were 
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particularly affected.63 Although exports temporarily increased (Exhibit 10), Sweden’s composite 
purchasing managers’ index (PMI) declined from 55.3 index points in February to 45.6 index 
points in March, with the manufacturing sector being more heavily impacted than the services 
sector (Exhibit 16). Household consumption fell sharply, decreasing 2.5% in quarter one,64 
although this decline is less than other countries as well as the EU aggregate of 3.0%.65   The main 
factors of consumption shrinkage were reduced expenses for transportation and vehicles, as well 
as a substantial decline in purchases abroad.66 Unemployment rose from 7.5% in January to 8.2% 
in February, before dropping to 7.1% in March (Exhibit 5). In comparison, the EU‘s aggregate 
average unemployment rate was 6.4% in March.  
 
The Rising Star of the Public Health Agency   
Responsible in large part for Sweden’s unique approach, the PHA, led by Tegnell, began 
to attract a great deal of attention. Tegnell became famous all over the world for what many deemed 
to be a brazen approach. His press conferences became globally viewed, and Tegnell’s face could 
be seen sported on tattoos and t-shirts in Stockholm as well as in other countries around the world, 
where his method for combating the pandemic was applauded.67 In April, Tegnell expressed 
confidence in Sweden’s tactics, and despite qualifying that herd immunity was not the express goal 
of the nudge approach, he predicted that herd immunity in Stockholm could be mere weeks away. 
Despite being often misrepresented with regards to her immunity, Tegnell maintained that Sweden 
was seeking a way to live long term with the virus, asserting, “We believe herd immunity will of 
course help us in the long run, and we are discussing that, but it's not like we are actively trying to 
achieve it as has been made out (by the press and some scientists). If we wanted to achieve herd 
immunity, we would have done nothing and let coronavirus run rampant through society. We are 
trying to keep the transmission rate as low as we can.” 
Tegnell’s approach was met with a great deal of backlash within the scientific community 
of Sweden.  Starting in April, members of a scientific forum on COVID-19 called Vetenskapsform 
COVID-19 decried Tegnell’s guidelines and measures as irresponsible and highly dangerous. 
Many openly expressed fear and condemnation for Tegnell’s approach as well as for the Swedish 
national government’s inability to take uniform action on a national level and bypass the 
bureaucratic red tape which restricts national mandates.68 Many of the scientists and disease 
specialists who expressed dissent in this way faced backlash and personal threats. 
While almost every other country in the world closed down schools and in-person learning, 
Sweden maintained that all persons 15 years of age or under were required to attend school in-
person. Parents of children with pre-existing conditions that would make them more susceptible 
to a serious case of COVID-19 feared that they may have had their children taken away if they 
didn’t send them to school because the Swedish government did not identify children as a group 
at risk for any sort of serious infection from COVID-19.69 
At the end of May, more than 5,000 people had died in Sweden from COVID-19. Although 
Sweden made it through the first wave with excess deaths per 100,000 lower than numbers reported 
by Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, its numbers far eclipsed its Nordic neighbors of 
Norway, Finland and Denmark who detected no excess death during the first wave.70 
 
In Calm Water, Every Ship Has a Good Captain 
After a rocky first wave, public opinion was a bit shaken in Sweden, with faith in the 
government’s handling of the pandemic falling but many Swedes still backing their nation’s 
approach and feeling vindicated.  The first wave having passed, Sweden experienced low daily 
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infection and daily death figures for most of the summer.  However, even as many hailed Tegnell 
and Sweden for seemingly finding a way around lockdown measures without experiencing 
catastrophic consequences, many were just as unconvinced. Confidence in the nation’s 
undertaking of the pandemic dropped 11 points to 45% from April to June. In June, Löfven’s 
approval rating also fell by 10 points. Tegnell admitted that more should have been done to contain 
the spread of the virus in elderly homes and that a more ideal strategy would have balanced 
Sweden’s approach and the rest of the world’s but reaffirmed that “the basic strategy worked well” 
and “based on the knowledge we had then, we feel we made the appropriate decisions.”  Tegnell 
stuck to the principle that lockdowns were not sustainable long term and violated other central 
components of what public health should do as they could lead to other health problems such as 
mental health issues.71 
Löfven also remained generally unwavering when on his fealty to the country’s 
strategy.  Curiously, some of the most vocal dissent on the pandemic strategy in Sweden, came 
from the far-right Swedish Democrats.  Aside from generally wishing to oppose the measures of a 
left winged government, the Swedish Democrats assert that immigrants and asylum seekers who 
had not complied with guidelines over a lack of understanding exposed elderly people at the care 
homes they worked at.72   
Though a majority of Swedes said that COVID-19 led them to desire greater cooperation 
with the EU, the proportion of Swedes that maintained that claim was less than the proportion of 
any other European country surveyed. As Swede’s looked inward, cynicism infected perspectives 
on domestic and international affairs (Exhibit 19). 
 
Quarter Two Economic Performance 
Unlike the unwavering attitude of the Swedish government, the Swedish economy took a 
hard hit in the second quarter. The impact of the COVID-19 on the Swedish economy was 
extensive in the second quarter. GDP plummeted by 8.3 percent (Exhibit 11), which was the 
largest recorded decline in GDP over the past 40 years.73 This marked a great difference between 
Sweden’s economy in quarter one, which emerged comparably unscathed, and in quarter two, 
which hit a historic low. However, compared to Germany, France, Italy, and Spain individually, 
as well as the aggregate EU GDP percent change, Sweden’s economy performed better overall 
(Exhibit 15). The EU saw a decrease in GDP of 11.4% in the second quarter, while the Euro-area 
saw a decline of 11.8%,74 the largest the EU has experienced since its beginnings in 1995.75 In the 
Nordic neighboring countries, GDP fell less than in Sweden,76 with Denmark reporting 7.4% 
decrease,77 Norway reporting 6.3% decrease,78 and Finland reporting 4.5% decrease.79  
 
This broad downturn in the economy could be attributed to both domestic demand and 
foreign trade falling markedly. The second quarter saw Swedish exports of goods decrease by 16% 
in value and by 15% in volume compared with quarter one, and imports of goods decreased by 
12% in value and 10% in volume from quarter one. Comparatively, the EU 27 exports fell by 21% 
and imports by 19%.80 Sweden’s manufacturing sector was especially impacted by the external 
trade environment. In April, the manufacturing PMI index continued to fall by 6.9 points from 
March to 38.7 points, before slowly increasing by 2.4 points to 41.1 points in May and jumping to 
50.1 points in June. The services sector was less severely affected in Sweden compared to other 
European countries, with PMI remaining well above the EU figures throughout the second quarter 
(Exhibit 16).  
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Household consumption dropped another 7.9% from the first quarter.81 In the EU, 
household consumption dropped 12.3%, the largest decline since 1999.82 However, after Sweden’s 
consumer confidence dropped to 73.6% in April from 89.7% in March, the figure recovered 
throughout the second quarter with May and June reporting 77.9% and 84.5% consumer 
confidence in the economy, respectively.83 Unemployment in the second quarter rose dramatically, 
from 8.2% in April to 9% in May, finishing at 9.8% in June.84 The EU reported an aggregate of 
7.1% unemployment in June.85 As of July 15th, the Swedish manufacturing sector accounted for 
30 percent of all temporary layoffs, although it only provides 15 percent of total employment 
(Exhibit 16). The stock market showed recovery as well, climbing back up to 1600 points in June 
from a low of 1300 points in late-March (Exhibit 12).  
 
Forgetting the Elderly  
  In May, research showed unfavorable results for the public health of the country. The PHA 
predicted that 40 percent of the Stockholm population would have gotten COVID-19 and 
consequently, the antibodies that would protect them by May. However, the agency’s data 
collected in June indicated that only 11.4 percent of people had such antibodies in Stockholm.86 
  The PHA attributed the high COVID-19 death rates in Sweden to the large proportion of 
deaths that occurred in nursing homes, due to shortcomings in elderly care. The high infection rate 
across the country was the underlying factor that led to a high number of those becoming infected 
in care homes. Many sick elderlies were not seen by a doctor because the country’s hospitals were 
implementing a triage system that appeared to have factored in age and predicted prognosis. This 
likely reduced intensive care unit load at the cost of more high-risk patients — like elderly people 
with confirmed infection — dying outside the ICU.87 Only 13% of the elderly residents who died 
with COVID-19 during the spring received hospital care, according to preliminary statistics from 
the National Board of Health and Welfare released in August.88 
 
Mikael Fjällid, a Swedish private consultant in anesthetics and intensive care, says he 
believes "a lot of lives" could have been saved if more patients had been able to access hospital 
treatment, or if care home workers were given increased responsibilities to administer oxygen 
themselves, instead of waiting for specialist COVID-19 response teams or paramedics.87 
 
 
Luck Never Gives; It Only Lends 
After a seemingly reassuring summer, a new tide of infection arrived to rock the Nordic 
nation and send COVID-19 cases soaring with exponential turbulence. Faith in Löfven’s handling 
of the pandemic plummeted as a mere 34% of Swedes approved of the prime minister’s 
efforts.  Following suit, support for the Social Democrats tumbled to 29.4% as citizens grew more 
and more uncharacteristically cynical and uncertain about their futures.88 Even support For 
Tegnell, the once shining poster-boy of the Swedish way, dropped.  
 
Quarter Three Economic Performance:  
The end of September marked the end of the third quarter in the fiscal year. In the third 
quarter, Sweden’s economy seemingly began making a recovery from the hit it experienced in the 
second quarter. GDP increased by 4.9 percent when compared to quarter two (Exhibit 11), mainly 
driven by increased exports of goods and household consumption. In quarter three, export of goods 
and services grew 11.2% and imports of goods and services grew 9.2%.89 In August and 
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September, exports rebounded to pre-pandemic levels.90 Composite PMI scores averaged 55 
points, a slight improvement over quarter two (Exhibit 16).  
Market production increased by 6.7%, with output in goods-producing industries 
increasing by 11.2 percent, in service-producing industries, by 4.5%, and in government 
production, by 1.8% percent.91 Comparatively, the EU experienced higher growth in terms of GDP 
and growth of exports and imports. GDP grew by 11.5% while exports increased by 17.2% and 
imports by 12.9% in the EU.92 Notably, every country Sweden had outperformed in quarter two in 
terms of GDP growth experienced higher performance in this quarter -- Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
France all experienced growth greater than 8%, with France topping the chart at 18.2% (Exhibit 
18). 
Household consumption increased by 6.3%, mostly made up of consumption of transports, 
as well as hotel and restaurant services.93 Although this is a positive improvement for the Swedish 
economy, this figure lagged behind that of the aggregate for the EU. The EU reported a 13.2% 
increase in household consumption.94 Unemployment saw a decrease in Sweden as well, finishing 
at 8.3% compared to quarter two’s 9.8% (Exhibit 5). This figure is slightly higher than the EU’s 
aggregate unemployment rate at 8.3% in quarter three, but shows improvement in the labor sector 
of the Swedish economy.95 Consumer confidence showed a slow but steady increase from 84.5% 
at the end of quarter two to 88% at the end of quarter three.  
 
Tensions Rising at Home  
In the backdrop of an economy healing from the damage done the previous quarter and 
internationally lauded low infection rates from the summer, the Swedish government attempted to 
continue with its previous, calm demeanor. Tegnell reiterated the party’s position that a growing 
death count did mean the strategy was necessarily going wrong, and remained optimistic 
throughout early October that Sweden’s measures had successfully prevented a second wave of 
cases from taking place.96 Other countries in Europe had started to see a substantial second wave 
that Sweden was simply not experiencing.97 Unfortunately for Tegnell, Löfven, and Swedish 
public, this anomaly proved merely to be a delay as Sweden began to rapidly accrue new case 
counts.  
On October 23rd, a record high number of 1,870 daily cases was recorded in Sweden. In 
response to this, the PHA determined the peak infection number during the spring was likely much 
higher but went unrecorded due to the lack of testing at the time. Four days later, on October 27th, 
1,980 new cases were registered, the highest number since the start of the pandemic.98 One week 
later, on November 3rd, that number grew tenfold to 10,177. One more week passed, and the daily 
infection numbers reach 15,779 on November 10th. Amidst international and domestic scrutiny, 
exponential surges in cases, and intensive-care beds almost full in Stockholm hospitals, Löfven 
was forced to walk back the government’s continuously lax attitude and make a second public 
address. 
 
A Departure from the Swedish Way 
On November 22nd, Löfven held for the second time in a calendar year, a most 
unprecedented live national address to the entire country. Both times Löfven spoke about COVID-
19, but in late-November, the message had changed dramatically. Instead of the reassurance that 
there could be a middle path that protected both the economy and the people while circumventing 
national lockdown measures, there was a desperate plea for compliance with social distancing 
guidelines and frantic backpedaling. Löfven announced public gatherings are now capped at eight 
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people, schools are to be shut down, some for the first time, and alcohol sales are to be banned 
after 10 p.m. Institutions that had all been kept open for the duration of the pandemic were now 
closed. The PHA, along with Tegnell, were undermined and had their roles in the decision-making 
process for COVID-19 policy formally diminished.99 After the press conference ended, Löfven 
went as far as tweeting out urgent requests for citizens to refrain from going out to dinner, 
travelling, or going to the gym after the address to deliver his point.  
The aura of calm that Swedes projected was fading. The government had acknowledged 
that the latest COVID-19 flare-up meant the economy will be weaker over the coming months than 
previously thought. Swedish Finance Minister Magdalena Andersson said the pandemic is now 
“just as serious” in Sweden as it was back in March and April. “The transmission we have seen 
recently, and the measures taken here and in other countries, are expected to dampen the economic 
recovery,” she said at a press briefing on Wednesday, November 18th.100 
The PHA also made policy U-turn from before, bowing to critics who have argued it has 
underestimated the potential for asymptomatic transmission of COVID-19. The agency said on 
December 1st that it recommended children who live with somebody infected by coronavirus to 
stay at home, contrary to previous advice that they should go to school or nursery. It follows yet 
another previous reversal in October that led to a recommendation that adults who live with an 
infected person should receive instructions from a doctor, including possibly seven days of 
quarantine rather than go to work as normal.101  
As cases rose in the late autumn at one of the highest rates in the world, those in Sweden 
began to seek to identify who or what might be culpable for the spike. Some blame healthcare 
systems for its shortcomings and the structure of the Swedish government. Some blame experts, 
some blame the politicians. The government’s contemptuous relationship with the PHA that had 
long drawn media attention had also come to a head. In October, it was revealed that there has 
been a lack of written communication between the prime minister and the PHA when one new 
outlet requested all correspondence between the prime minister’s office and the PHA for the period 
of January 1st to September 14th, and the prime minister’s registrar replied that none existed.102 
Furthermore, on December 15th, Löfven appeared to levy the blame on health officials who he 
claimed underestimated the propensity for a heavy new influx of cases.103  
By December 9th, 2020, 99% of Stockholm’s intensive care beds were in use and the local 
health authorities requested staffing assistance from national officials. Instead of continuing on 
with the recommendation-based approach, the government began drafting a piece of legislation 
that would allow the government to circumvent constitutionally codified restrictions on mandating 
lockdowns and fining non-compliers. The bill, which would allow the minority coalition to cut 
shops' opening hours and limit footfall, is due to take effect in March if it makes it through the 
consultation process.104 
 
The Economy Responds  
The consumer confidence indicator in Sweden decreased by 0.9 points from the previous 
month to 89.2 in November 2020, as a second wave of infections and new restriction measures 
weighed on sentiment. Households became more negative about their own finances and about the 
development of the Swedish economy.105 However, the Swedbank Manufacturing PMI for Sweden 
rose to 59.1 in November of 2020 from an upwardly revised 58.3 in the previous month, the 
strongest expansion in factory activity since December of 2017, suggesting a robust recovery from 
the pandemic shock. Sweden's Services PMI rose to 58.6 in November 2020 from an upwardly 
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revised 55.3 in the previous month, pointing to the sixth consecutive expansion in the services 
sector and the strongest since November 2018, driven by business activity and employment.  
 
The newly introduced stricter COVID-19 response measures, while needed to fight the virus, are 
likely to dent economic growth, although the rebound seen during the summer months was stronger 
than expected, meaning it’s not yet clear how much full-year forecasts will need to be adjusted. 
The Swedish Finance Ministry’s latest estimate for 2020 points to a 4.6% contraction.106 
 
Elsewhere in Scandinavia  
 
Denmark 
Denmark, a small country of 5.8 million people and Sweden’s neighbor and “old enemy” 
southwest of the Baltic Sea, was the second European country to implement what was considered 
at the time, exceptionally strict lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On 
March 11th, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced the closure of all schools and 
universities across the country, in addition to paid leave for all non-crucial public sector employees 
and encouraged the switch to remote working conditions for private sector employees and 
businesses.107 Restaurants, day cares, cafes, and gyms were all shut down, gatherings of more than 
10 people were banned, and borders were closed to almost all foreigners with few exceptions.108 
These lockdown measures were extended until April 15th, after which restrictions began easing in 
hopes of preventing Denmark from falling into a deep recession.109  
As a result of these lockdown measures, the Danish economy contracted by 2.1% in quarter 
one, followed by a 6.9% decline in quarter two that rebounded by 4.9% in quarter three. Quarter 
one and quarter two’s economic performance was driven by low private consumption resulting 
from containment measures, as well as low government spending due to school closures and drops 
in exports and imports.110 In the third quarter, easing of lockdown restrictions contributed to 
overall growth and the strongest quarterly growth rate on record. With the exception of the first 
quarter, overall, Denmark has outperformed Sweden economically in both the second and third 
quarters.  
Although Denmark has the second highest infection and death rate among the four 
Scandinavian countries, its numbers are several times smaller than Sweden’s at 100,489 total 
infections and 918 total deaths as of December 8th, 2020, compared to Sweden’s 304,793 infections 
and 7,296 deaths.111 Danes embrace a culture of trust like the Swedes, and adhered to the strict 
lockdown measures in March. As such, the country was able to ease some lockdown measure in 
April after having controlled the initial surge in COVID-19 infections. In June, the Danish 
government launched a COVID-19 infection tracing app that was downloaded more than 660,000 
times, totaling approximately 12 percent of the Danish population, by July. The app allows citizens 
to self-report diagnosis and notifies them when they have been in close proximity to an infected. 
As a result of these measures, public approval for the Danish government’s handling of the 
pandemic at 95% was higher than each of the other 13 countries surveyed in August.112  
 
Norway  
A country of 5.3 million citizens and Sweden’s neighbor directly to the west, Norway 
implemented strict lockdown measures in the beginning of the pandemic as well. On March 12th, 
2020, the government closed daycare centers, schools, and universities, as well as restaurants, 
gyms, and other businesses. Borders were closed to almost all foreigners, with few exceptions. 
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Social distancing requirements were also in place.113 These measures were extended through April, 
before the government started easing restrictions in May.114  
Norway saw similar economic performance as its neighbors who implemented strict 
lockdown procedures, with quarter one GDP contracting by 1.7%,115 quarter two dropping further 
by 5.1%116, the steepest decline ever recorded, and recovering in quarter three by 4.6%.117 Key 
factors of poor economic performance in the first two quarters include low private consumption, 
low government consumption, and drop in exports and imports respectively.118 In quarter three, 
with the easing of restrictions, domestic demands and private consumption grew along with 
government consumption and exports and imports of goods and services, leading to economic 
recovery.119 
Norway has the third highest infection rate and lowest death rate in Scandinavia, with a 
total of 39,524 infections120 and 382 total deaths121 as of December 8th. In June, the Norwegian 
Prime Minister Erna Solberg admitted that its lockdown measures may have been too tough, as 
evidence had shown that the disease did not spread as quickly as authorities previously 
predicted.122 The COVID-19 tracing app that was successfully launched in Denmark was shut 
down weeks after its launch in Norway due to privacy concerns.123 Nonetheless, Solberg’s 
conservative party received a surge in public support for its handling of coronavirus, pushing it 
into the lead for the second month running. Widespread public support for the government’s 
handling of the pandemic deprived the opposition bloc of a majority for the first time in more than 
a year.124 Norway is also the only country to have been able to maintain a stable number of 
infections since the beginning of the second wave in November.125  
 
Finland   
Finland borders Sweden to the northwest, Russia to the east, and has a population of 5.5 
million people. Like its Scandinavian neighbors, Finland implemented strict lockdown procedures 
by declaring a state of emergency in the beginning of March and enforcing physical distancing 
measures, leading to a slow reopening of society a few months later in May.126 However, one big 
distinction between Finland and all other European countries is its focus on preparedness and how 
to act in national emergencies, born out of its collective experience during the Winter War in 1939-
40 against the Soviet Union. Its law on preparedness explicitly mentions pandemics and was 
triggered for the first time since the second world war while its emergency stockpiles of medical 
and protective equipment were the envy of the continent amid shortages elsewhere.127 
Although its economy similarly contracted by 0.9% in the first quarter and 4.5% in the 
second quarter, it grew by a record-best amount, 3.3%, in the third quarter.128 Although the Finnish 
economy took a dive in the second quarter due to its strict lockdown measures and decreased 
consumption and trade, the country was able to keep its COVID-19 infection rates at a record low 
level.129 As of December 8th, Finland reported a mere total of 29,572 cases, the lowest among all 
continental European countries, and a total death count of 442. Finnish Prime Minister Sanna 
Marin has enjoyed high approval ratings of 85% for her government’s handling of the pandemic.130 
 
Is it Too Little Too Late for a Success Story? 
Sweden seems to have been able to escape some of the harshest economic consequences 
that many states around the world experienced as their economies were rocked by shutdowns. As 
the government begins to reevaluate its strategy going forward, there is an undeniable reckoning 
occurring as Sweden must accept its vulnerability to a globalized world. The Swedish 
government fallaciously relied on individual responsibility to prevent the spread of a virus 
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wreaking havoc all over the world.  Measures taken to slow transmission while accounting for 
efforts to preserve the economy did not come close to achieving their medical goal, but whether 
refraining from a shutdown was enough to save the economy in a significant way is not as clear. 
 What is clear is that as the situation in Sweden fluctuates, those who are on either side of 
the debate on Sweden’s COVID-19 strategy have found themselves at some point in time 
seemingly vindicated by the data and events unfolding at that same time frame. 
Sweden attempted to be exceptional in its efforts to contain COVID-19 as well as 
preserve its economy and may have wound up successful in neither pursuit. As Prime Minister 
Löfven works with his government to take greater action on a national level that parallels more 
conventional COVID-19 containment strategies and Anders Tegnell finds himself less relevant 
and revered, Sweden must come to face with the reality that it may have to do just what it 
















Exhibit 1: The Swedish Healthcare Governance Structure  
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Source:   Kavaliunas, Andrius, Pauline Ocaya, Jim Mumper, Isis Lindfeldt, and Mattias Kyhlstedt. 
“Swedish Policy Analysis for Covid 19.” Health policy and technology. Fellowship of 
Postgraduate Medicine. Published by Elsevier Ltd., August 29, 2020. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7455549/. 
 
Exhibit 2: Swedish Public Health Agency’s Guidance to Protecting Oneself  
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Exhibit 3: Timeline of Swedish Policy Interventions  
 
Source:   Kavaliunas, et. al., “Swedish Policy Analysis for Covid 19.”  
 
Exhibit 4a: Dec 2019 Unemployment Rates           
 
Source: “The Swedish Economy December 2019.” konj.se. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
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Exhibit 4b: Dec 2019 Household and Business Confidence Indicator  
 
Source: “The Swedish Economy December 2019.” konj.se. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH. 
  
Exhibit 4c: Dec 2019 Export Orders in Manufacturing  
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Exhibit 5: Sweden Unemployment Rates  
 
Source: “Sweden Unemployment Rate1980-2020 Data: 2021-2022 Forecast: Calendar: 
Historical.” Sweden Unemployment Rate | 1980-2020 Data | 2021-2022 Forecast | 
Calendar | Historical. Accessed December 16, 2020. 
https://tradingeconomics.com/sweden/unemployment-rate. 
 
Exhibit 6a: Swedish Daily Coronavirus  
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Exhibit 6b: Swedish Daily Coronavirus Death  
 
Source:  “Sweden Coronavirus Figures.” Worldometer. Worldmeter, December 11, 2020. 
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/sweden/. 
 
Exhibit 7: Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation on March 22, 2020  
This evening, I would like to speak directly to you, the Swedish people. The COVID-19 virus is 
testing our country, our society and all of us as fellow human beings. Every person now needs to 
mentally prepare for what is coming. 
In Sweden, the COVID-19 virus is now spreading in the community. Lives, health and jobs are at 
risk. More people will get the disease, more people will have to say a final farewell to a loved one. 
The only way to manage this crisis is to face it as a society, with everyone taking responsibility 
for themselves, for each other and for our country. 
I know that many of you are worried. Worried about how our society will manage this crisis. 
Worried about yourself, about someone you love who is in an at-risk group, or that your job will 
disappear. I understand this. The coming months will be trying. But our society is strong. Our 
government agencies are working hard day and night. Our health care and education professionals 
and many, many other people in critical jobs are keeping our country going. 
I, as Prime Minister, and the Government I lead, will take every decision that is necessary to protect 
the lives, health and jobs of as many people as we possibly can. 
In Sweden, public gatherings of more than 500 people have been banned, and upper secondary 
school and university education is now conducted online. I want you to be prepared for the 
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possibility of further far-reaching decisions, sometimes at short notice, sometimes disrupting our 
everyday lives even more. 
The aim of the Government’s work is to limit the spread of infection, to prevent too many people 
becoming seriously ill at the same time. But also to secure health care resources, and at this difficult 
time lessen the impact for those of you who work and for businesses. Be prepared for this to 
continue for a long time. Be ready for the situation to change rapidly. But you should also know 
that we as a society are tackling this crisis with our collective strength. Now we all have a great 
personal responsibility. 
There are a few critical times in life when you must make sacrifices, not just for your own sake, 
but also for those around you, for your fellow human beings, and for our country. That time is 
now. That day has come. And the duty is everyone’s. Each and every one of us has a responsibility 
to prevent the spread of infection, to protect older people and those in other vulnerable groups. 
None of us should risk it. None of us should go to work with symptoms of illness. Young, old, 
rich, poor – it doesn’t matter, everyone must play their part. This also applies to those of you who 
are 70 or older, or who belong to other at-risk groups. I understand that it is frustrating to have to 
restrict your life, your social interactions, but right now it is necessary. For the sake of your own 
health of course, but also to protect other people and give the health care system a chance to 
manage the situation. 
And the adults among us must now behave like adults. Not spread panic or rumours. No one is 
facing this crisis alone, but everyone bears a huge responsibility. Each and every one of us. I know 
that the demands are huge. But this is the only way we can hold back the spread of infection. I 
know that some restrictions are trying. But this is how we can make sure that the health care system 
can manage the crisis. I know that the situation feels tough. But following the advice of the 
authorities is every person’s duty. Yours – and mine. 
Many of you are taking your responsibility as fellow human beings. You are helping your 
neighbours with their shopping, you are supporting your local restaurant by buying a takeaway 
lunch, you are not visiting your grandmother – but you are ringing her every day for a chat instead. 
This is solidarity in practice. I am proud to be Sweden’s Prime Minister when I see what so many 
people are doing for their fellow human beings. 
You are showing that when things are at their toughest, our solidarity is strongest. I am sure that 
every one of you in Sweden will take your personal responsibility and do your utmost to safeguard 
other people’s health and help each other. And that you will be able to look back on this crisis and 
be proud of your role, your contributions for your fellow human beings, for our society and for 
Sweden. 
Thank you 
Source: “Prime Minister's Address to the Nation, 22 March 2020.” Regeringskansliet. 
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Exhibit 8: Public Opinion Surveys on Sweden’s COVID - 19 Strategy 
 
 
Source: Erik Wengström Professor. “Coronavirus: Survey Reveals What Swedish People Really 
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Exhibit 9: 2018 Swedish General Election Results  
Source: “POLITICO Poll of Polls - Swedish Polls, Trends and Election News for Sweden.” 
POLITICO. Accessed December 17, 2020. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-
polls/sweden/.  
Exhibit 10: Percent Change in Trade in Export Goods, Q3 2019 – Q3 2020  
 
Source:  “International Trade - Trade in Goods - OECD Data.” the OECD. OECD, October 31, 
2020. https://data.oecd.org/trade/trade-in-goods.htm. 
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Exhibit 11: Percent Change in GDP Previous Quarter (Data Up to Date to include 2020 Q3)  
 
Source:  “GDP (1993–), Percent Change from Previous Quarter.” Statistiska Centralbyrån. 




Exhibit 12: Sweden Stock Market Performance, Jan 2020 - Dec 2020 
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Source: “Sweden Stock Market (OMX 30)1986-2020 Data: 2021-2022 Forecast: Quote: Chart.” 
Sweden Stock Market (OMX 30) | 1986-2020 Data | 2021-2022 Forecast | Quote | Chart. 
Accessed December 13, 2020. https://tradingeconomics.com/sweden/stock-market 
Exhibit 13: Progression of Strictness of National COVID-19 Policies  
 
Source:  Laurent, Lionel. “COVID Second Wave: Sweden Offers Hard Reality Check Ahead of 
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Exhibit 14: Cultural Map of the World 
 
Source: “World Values Survey Association.” WVS Database. Accessed December 16, 2020. 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
Exhibit 15: Swedish GDP Change Relative to Other European Countries, Q1 & Q2 2020  
 
Source:  Savage, Maddy. “Coronavirus: Sweden's Economy Hit Less Hard by Pandemic.” BBC 
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Exhibit 16a: Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index for Sweden, Q1 and Q2 2020 
 
Source: oecd.org. OECD, March 2020. https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/OECD-
economic-surveys-sweden-2019-overview.pdf. 
 
Exhibit 16b: Services Purchasing Managers Index for Sweden, Q1 and Q2 2020 
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Exhibit 16c: Composite Purchasing Managers Index for Sweden, Q1 2019 to Q3 2020 
 
Source: “Sweden Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), Composite, October, 2020 - Data, Chart.” 
TheGlobalEconomy.com, October 31, 2020. 
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sweden/pmi_composite/. 
Exhibit 17: Swedish GDP  
 
Source: “Sweden Economic Growth - Data, Chart.” TheGlobalEconomy.com. Accessed 
December 16, 2020. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sweden/Economic_growth/. 
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Exhibit 18: GDP Growth Rates in Q3, 2020, in the EU and Euro Area  
 
Sources: “GDP up by 12.5% and Employment up by 1.0% in the Euro Area.” eurostat.com. 
Eurostat, December 8, 2020. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/10662330/2-08122020-AP-EN.pdf. 
Exhibit 19: Attitudes Toward EU in Times of COVID-19 
 
Source:  Dennison, Susi, Claire Busse, Daniel Mainwaring, Franziska Brantner, Gustav Gressel, 
Goran Buldioski, and Theodore Murphy. “Together in Trauma: Europeans and the World 
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